We study the problem of analyzing falsifying traces of cyber-physical systems. Speci cally, given a system model and an input which is a counterexample to a property of interest, we wish to understand which parts of the inputs are "responsible" for the counterexample as a whole. Whereas this problem is well known to be hard to solve precisely, we provide an approach based on learning from repeated simulations of the system under test.
INTRODUCTION
We present a simulation-based approach to analyze a given set of counterexamples to temporal logic properties of cyber-physical systems (CPS) towards understanding the root causes that underlie the given counterexamples. e problem of nding counterexamples to system speci cation is known as falsi cation.
ere are many approaches to falsi cation, including symbolic approaches using model checking and simulation-based approaches that treat the system as a black-box and a empt to nd inputs that lead to a counterexample. Simulation-based approaches have been well studied in the recent past [2, 5, 15, 27] . is research has led to tools such as S-Taliro [6] and Breach [14] , and has been demonstrated through case studies in widely varying domains such as automotive systems [18] and medical devices [9, 33, 34] .
Arguably, a successful discovery of a counterexample to a property is o en a starting point rather than the end goal of the analysis process. For instance, in many applications it may be important to understand the root causes of a falsi cation in terms of the inputs to the system. is process is o en manually implemented using trial and error. However, for large systems with many input parameters and signals, a manual analysis is o en time consuming, requiring expertise in the problem domain as well as an understanding of the underlying veri cation techniques.
Similarly, in other applications a counterexample may only be deemed a possible bug if it is preserved under suitably small perturbations. Otherwise, they are potentially classi ed as "low likelihood" or even artifacts of the modeling process. us, techniques to explore the neighborhood of the counterexample are very important. A key objective of the research presented in this paper is to automate such processes.
Understanding the sensitivity of the output with respect to small variations in the input is typically studied under the general term of sensitivity analysis [32] across multiple disciplines including scienti c and mathematical modeling, operations research, and risk and decision analysis. ere are two variants of sensitivity analysislocal and global sensitivity analysis. Given a complex deterministic system = η(x) and a baseline estimate x 0 , local sensitivity analysis is concerned with understanding how changes in the input x around x 0 a ect the output of the system. Local sensitivity analysis is based on derivatives of η(·) evaluated at x = x 0 and measures how the output changes when di erent variables (dimensions of x) are individually varied across their range while keeping other variables constant to their baseline values. e results of local sensitivity analysis are o en presented using sensitivity graphs, tornado diagrams, or spider diagrams [16] . ese diagrams o er a visual cue to understand relative relevance of the variables (dimensions) with respect to the output. However, the local sensitivity approach is no longer appropriate [31] when we wish to understand the joint in uence of multiple inputs perturbed at the same time.
Global sensitivity analysis [31] , on the other hand, involve the use of machine learning to infer classi ers that explains output as function of inputs by simulating points in the neighborhood of the given nominal value. However, these approaches either yield opaque models that are hard to interpret for the purposes of root-cause understanding, or provide poor accuracy in some cases, leading to incorrect results.
e approach presented in this paper extends sensitivity analysis to generalize neighborhood of counterexamples by computing a box neighborhood around the original counterexample with a guarantee that if a point were to be chosen at random from this neighborhood according to a xed sampling distribution, that point would also yield a counterexample with a high probability threshold that is a parameter to our search procedure. We call such a box a falsifying neighborhood of the given counterexample. e approach relies on simulations, and e ectively treats the system as a black-box with assumptions that guarantee the existence of a neighborhood in the rst place. We employ Bayesian statistical hypothesis testing as the basis for checking if a given box is indeed a falsifying neighborhood.
We describe the algorithms for computing falsifying neighborhoods from a given seed counterexample. We demonstrate these algorithms on a few nontrivial case studies drawn from the literature. Wherever possible, we compare our approach with other related approaches such as local sensitivity analysis using sensitivity graphs and tornado diagrams, and decision tree classi cation.
A MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Let us consider a Simulink /State ow™ model of an automatic transmission controller, originally proposed by Zhao et al [41] , to motivate our approach. e model contains nonlinearities and hybrid switching behavior in the form of discontinuous blocks and a state ow diagram. Figure 1 shows the top level Simulink model. e model has one continuous input signal u (t ) that lies inside the range [0, 100] for all time t, representing the user's thro le input through the accelerator pedal and two outputs that represent the vehicle speed (t ) and the engine RPM r (t ). e total simulation time is T = 30 seconds. We parameterize the input signal u (t ) as a piecewise constant signal represented by a vector of control points (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u 7 ), wherein
is parameterization is perhaps too simplistic to capture realistic user behavior. However, a simpler input parameterization makes it easier to visualize our approach. We are interested in nding if the system always satis es the temporal property ϕ 1 : the speed should always remain below 120 kmph or the engine speed should remain below 4500 RPM. To violate this property, we search for a piecewise constant input signal u (t ) that causes both the speed and the engine RPM to exceed their prescribed limits. e S-Taliro tool produces the counterexample described by the control points:
(u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u 7 ) = (56.7, 96.6, 91.9, 99.9, 98.6, 95.7, 69.6) . Figure 2 shows the input thro le and the output speed and RPM, highlighting the property violation.
As such, it is not clear how the values of the various control points a ect the overall counterexample. To do so, we perform local sensitivity analysis by considering each input in isolation while xing the remaining inputs and present the results as a tornado diagram that shows how far each input can be varied while still obtaining counterexamples. Figure 3(a) shows the resulting ranges for each of the 7 control points. At the same time, these ranges assume that only one input can vary at a time. However, in this example, they suggest that input u 5 needs to be varied inside the interval [20, 100] whereas other inputs can be set arbitrarily in their range. is is misleading since only one input is allowed to vary.
Figure 3(b) shows the actual box neighborhood wherein we claim that sampling any point uniformly at random in the neighborhood has at least a 99% chance of yielding a violation through our hypothesis testing procedure. happens when all the inputs are potentially varied simultaneously. It shows that inputs u 2 , u 3 , u 5 and u 6 have to be restricted to a narrow range around the actual counterexample, while the other inputs can be allowed to vary inside larger ranges. In particular, the values of u 4 and u 7 do not ma er as long as the other inputs are within their required ranges. Also, since u 7 a ects the value of the signal past the simulation horizon, it is not surprising that u 7 has li le e ect on the falsi cation. However, it is clear that the values of u 1 , u 2 , u 3 are responsible initially for exceeding the RPM limit, with a larger range of possible values of u 1 but with u 2 , u 3 xed around a very narrow range. Later in the simulations, the values of u 5 and u 6 ensure that the speed limit is exceeded.
Finally, we sample the neighborhood computed using our method to simulate each sample. Figure 4 shows the resulting violations, that are qualitatively similar to the original violation from Fig. 2 .
PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we present preliminary concepts required in the remainder of the paper. We begin by stating our basic assumptions on systems, the properties of interest, and the process of discovering counterexample using robustness-guided falsi cation approach [2] .
System Model and Property Speci cation
We assume that the systems are treated as black-boxes, i.e, they are equipped with simulation functions that allow us to simulate them for a given set of initial conditions and signals. Wherever needed, we will assume that the system satis es some conditions that allow us to reason about the properties of its counterexamples.
De nition 3.1 (System Model). A system Π is given by a tuple X , , X 0 , D,T that consists of:
(1) a state-space X ⊆ R n , where n is the dimensionality of the state-space over which the system evolves; (2) a forward simulator : (x 0 , u, t ).
For the sake of simplicity we make the following assumptions.
(1) We do not separately de ne the states and the outputs of the systems, assuming that all internal states are observable. Although this is seldom the case in a physical manifestation of the system, the assumption can be justi ed for simulationbased veri cation of hybrid systems. (2) We also assume a nite time horizon T for our investigations, since we will be restricted to simulations that can only be computed for nite times, in general.
We assume that the set of properties of the system are specied in formal temporal speci cation logic such as metric temporal logic (MTL) or signal temporal logic (STL) [15, 23] . ese temporal logics allow one to express rich temporal properties of the system including real-time properties. For instance, the property ϕ from our motivating example in Section 2 can be wri en as :
Given a formula ϕ, we de ne the robustness of a trace x with respect to φ as a real-valued quantity denoted r : R (x, ϕ). e robustness provides a measure of satisfaction of the trace with respect to the property and is such that:
(1) positive values of robustness indicate that the trace satis es the property (if r > 0 then x |= ϕ); (2) negative values of robustness indicate that the trace satises the negation of the property (if r < 0 then x |= ¬ϕ); (3) and the robustness provides a notion of distance between the trace and the property: every trace y s.t. ||y(t )−x(t )|| 2 ≤r also has the same outcome for the property as x.
We refer the reader to work by Fainekos & Pappas [17] and Donze & Maler [15] for a formal de nition of robustness for MTL and STL properties, respectively. It is important to note that there are tools, such as TaLiRo and Breach, to e ciently compute robustness of a trace wrt MTL formula. Finally, the techniques in this paper depend on taking in nite dimensional continuous time signals u(t ) and parameterizing them to a nite dimensional vector of control points. For this purpose we introduce a nitary parameterization of the input signals.
De nition 3.2 (Parameterization of the Signals
Common parameterizations are obtained by choosing time points t 0 : 0 ≤ t 1 < t 2 < · · · < t N ≤ t N +1 : T . We describe parameterizations for a single scalar-valued signal u (t ) below. Vector-valued extensions are also de ned similarly. Piecewise Constant: For piecewise-constant parameterizations the signal corresponding to control point v :
is is the parameterization used in the motivating example in section 2. Piecewise Linear: For piecewise-linear parameterizations the signal corresponding to control point v :
Piecewise Polynomial: ese are piecewise polynomial curves that are constructed using a nite set of control points. For a precise de nition and background on Bezier splines we refer to [30] .
We de ne the overall input parameterization of a system as V :
Finally, we recall the robustness-guided approach to nding counterexamples of properties, originally proposed by Nghiem et al [2, 27] .
e approach inputs a model Π and a property ϕ. It then xes a nite parameterization π of the inputs to the model. e search is cast as the following problem of solving constraints over the decision variables v for the control points such that the resulting trace x has a negative value of robustness:
In turn, the robustness is treated as an objective function and minimized using stochastic optimization techniques. Even though approach lacks the formal guarantees obtained using other symbolic model checking techniques, it is applicable at once to a wide variety of large non-linear models wherein simulations are much cheaper.
FALSIFYING NEIGHBORHOODS
In this section, we de ne the notion of a falsifying neighborhood for a given counterexample. In the subsequent section we describe our approach to infer such neighborhoods. Let Π : X , , X 0 , D,T be a system model under investigation, (V , π ) be an N -dimensional joint parameterization of the input signals U and initial conditions X 0 , and let ϕ be an MTL property of interest. Given v ∈ V , we de ne its associated robustness ρ (v, ϕ) wrt property ϕ to be equal to the robustness of the trace x(t ) obtained by simulating the system using the control signal and initial conditions derived from v i.e. ρ (v, ϕ) = R (x(t ), ϕ), where x(t ) = (π (v), t ).
Let v 0 : ( 1 , . . . , N ) ∈ V be a counterexample to ϕ obtained through a falsi cation tool. us, ρ (v 0 , ϕ) < 0. We will call v 0 the seed counterexample. Ideally, our goal is to construct an interval I (v 0 ) containing v 0 s.t. all control point in I yield falsi cations. 
Tornado Diagrams
A simple rst approach employs sensitivity analysis to investigate how much each entry i of v 0 can be varied while still obtaining a falsi cation. Let [l i , u i ] represent the absolute limits of the control point i in the set V . We characterize this using tornado diagrams. Tornado diagrams can be computed approximately through simulations by increasing the value of i along each dimension while keeping the others constant until a violation is no longer obtained. However, as mentioned before, the results can be misleading, since only a single dimension is considered at a time.
De nition 4.2 (Tornado Diagram
). A tornado diagram around v 0 is the largest interval T (v 0 ) : ([x 1 , 1 ], . . . , [x N , N ]) such that for each i ∈ [1, N ], we have that (a) l i ≤ x i ≤ i ≤ i ≤ u i , and (b) ρ (( 1 , . . . , i−1 ,ˆ i , i+1 , . . . , N ), ϕ)<0 for anyˆ i ∈[x i , i ],
Falsi cation Intervals
We now de ne the notion of a falsi cation neighborhood given a seed counterexample v 0 .
De nition 4.3 (Falsi cation Interval). An interval
is said to be a falsi cation interval around a seed counterexample v 0 wrt a property ϕ if v 0 ∈ I and furthermore, every control point v ∈ I is also a counterexample to ϕ.
Whereas the de nition is straightforward, it is noteworthy that it is hard (if not impossible) to formally verify whether a claimed interval I is indeed falsifying unless we resort to symbolic reasoning over the system trajectories. For this reason we rely on statistical evidence through simulations.
In order to provide such statistical evidence, we associate a probability D with the set of control points V . Such probabilities arise naturally in physical systems wherein the distribution that governs the inputs to the systems can be naturally associated with the control points. Failing this assumption, we may still associate distributions to represent a notion of relative weights of di erent control points in V . Since V is compact and the distribution D is chosen to be the uniform distribution in such a situation.
De nition 4.4 (Likely Falsi cation Interval)
. Given a distribution D over V , we say that an interval I is a probabilistic falsi cation interval with threshold c if and
We assume that v is sampled according to the distribution D. Also, c can be set to some high probability threshold such as 0.99.
Finally, we use statistical hypothesis testing to test if a given interval I is indeed a falsifying interval or not, using data gathered from simulating K samples chosen at random from I according to the distribution D (formally, we condition the probability on I and sample accordingly).
e statistical criterion we employ in this paper is simple:
(
Our approach will be based on the standard Bayesian hypothesis testing framework, using the Je ries Bayes factor test [20, 22, 42] . Let I be a given interval and p(I ) be an unknown probability that a randomly drawn sample from I is a counterexample. We consider two competing hypotheses:
Our goal is to use data from repeated samples to decide between H 1 vs. H 0 . We assume an uniform prior probability distribution over p(I ) re ecting our lack of information about what p(I ) should be. As a result, we associate a prior probability of c for H 0 and a prior probability of 1 − c for H 1 . Since c ∼ 0.99, we note that our prior beliefs overwhelmingly favor H 0 over H 1 .
Let v 1 , . . . , v K be some K samples drawn from I such that all of them are counterexamples. e probability that this happens under the hypothesis H 0 is given by
Likewise, the probability that this happens under H 1 is
e ratio of these probabilities is called the Bayes factor.
Bayes factor measures how the data transforms the prior odds of H 1 against H 0 to yield a posterior odds. It is therefore used as a measure of the strength of the evidence in favor of H 1 and against H 0 . Typically, a bayes factor greater than some xed number B will be used to accept H 1 over H 0 .
We can now calculate the value of K, the number of simulations needed for a given c and Bayes factor threshold of B, so that
log(c ) . For example, if we set c = 0.99 and B = 100, we require K > 460 simulations. A higher con dence level of B > 1000 and c = 0.99 requires K > 700. Typically, B > 100 is considered "decisive" in the literature [22] .
Formally the likelihood that we falsely accept H 1 when H 0 is really the truth is given by the formula 1 γ B+1 , where γ = 1−c c . For B = 100, and c = 0.99, this is nearly 1 2 . us, we shoot for a much higher value of B ∼ 10 5 for c = 0.99 in our experiments. 
us far, we have de ned likely falsi cation intervals and provided a statistical procedure to test whether a given interval is indeed a likely falsi cation interval, with a given probability threshold c. is procedure is described in Algorithm 1.
A type-1 error occurs when Algorithm returns A on an interval I that is in fact not a likely falsifying interval with threshold c (informally, the evidence fools us into accepting a false statement). e bounds above use the well-known rates of type-1 error for Bayes factor-based hypothesis testing. For our experiments, we set K = 1300 (a large number) for c = 0.99. is gives us a Bayes factor B = 4.15 × 10 5 and a probability of drawing a wrong conclusion of roughly 2.5 × 10 −4 . We will thus use Algorithm 1 with K = 1300.
FINDING NEIGHBORHOODS
us far, we have de ned the notion of a likely falsi cation interval and provided a simple procedure for checking a given likely falsi cation interval. In this section, we will focus on the inference of such intervals through simulations. Our procedure guarantees that if it nds an interval, the interval is guaranteed to be a likely falsi cation interval. e overall procedure involves three broad steps: 1) nding candidate intervals for the search, 2) testing the candidate interval and 3) shrinking a candidate interval if required.
Finding Candidate Intervals
We are given, as input a seed counterexample v 0 , a domain D :
Our goal is to nd likely intervals I 1 , . . . , I m that could be a candidate. To do so, we generate samples S : {v 1 , . . . , v k } over the domain D according to the distribution D, and partition the samples into two sets. e set S + contains all samples that satisfy the property ϕ
e remaining samples belong to the set S − . We enforce three requirements on the unknown candidate in-
(a) it must contain v 0 , the seed counterexample, (b) it must exclude all points in S + and (c) it must Figure 5 : is gure illustrates the construction of candidate intervals from simulation data. Here, the blue lled points represent control points satisfying ϕ whereas the black circles represent counterexamples.
e seed counterexample is shown as the black circle at the center. satisfy a minimum width criterion (ϵ 1 , . . . , ϵ N ), speci ed by the
However, there can be multiple falsifying intervals. Figure 5 shows how such intervals can arise naturally. In fact the number of possible intervals can be exponential in N , the dimensionality of the space V of control points. e problem of learning "good" intervals is closely related to the maximum empty rectangle problem that was recently shown to be NP-complete [7] . Given this intractability result, we propose an approach to pick nitely many such intervals using SMT (SATis ability modulo theory) solvers with an objective function that optimizes the width of the box along a particular dimension. e extension of SMT solvers with optimization has received increasing a ention recently [35] with widely used solvers such as Z3 supporting the maximization and minimization of objective functions [8] . We note that mixed integer linear programming solvers can also be used in this se ing. A comparison between MILP and SMT solvers is beyond the scope of this paper. SMT Encoding. We use variables x i , i to denote the upper and lower bounds of the candidate interval along the dimension i = 1, . . . , N . We rst enforce that the bounds must be in the domain D :
and must contain the seed counterexample v 0 : ( 1 , . . . , N ).
.
Next, we enforce a minimum width ϵ i along each dimension. is is a parameter input by the user:
Each point w : (w 1 , . . . , w N ) ∈ S + , must be excluded. We rst compare w i with the seed counterexample i . If w i ≥ i then the value of i needs to be adjusted or else the value of x i needs to be adjusted. We also use a parameter λ to place a "gap" between the interval boundaries [x i , i ] and the excluded counterexample:
e overall SMT encoding combines the formulas as follows:
e following theorem follows from the SMT formulation in a straightforward manner. T 5.1. Any falsifying interval that satis es the minimum width constraints also satis es the formula Ψ.
However, as mentioned earlier, the formula Ψ can have too many solutions. It is not feasible to explore them all. As a result, we use objective functions to help us select some solutions from this space. Maximum Number of Samples: A natural objective is to maximize the number of samples in S − set that the interval contains.
is is enforced in SMT solvers by adding "so constraints" with weights, which are then maximized by the solver while searching for a solution. Exploring a Pareto Frontier: Another approach is to explore the e cient frontier by se ing up objectives of the form
Testing and Re ning Candidates
Once we have a candidate interval I , we can apply the statistical testing described in Algorithm 1. If the candidate passes the statistical testing procedure we can output the interval. However, if the candidate fails the statistical test procedure, we have to arrive at a new candidate. We now discuss the re nement process. e re nement process for an interval I is triggered by a new sample w ∈ I such that ρ (w, ϕ) ≥ 0. We wish to re ne our interval I to exclude w. is can be achieved in one of the following manner.
(1) Back to "Drawing Board":
is approach simply augments the input data to the SMT formula from the previous section and recomputes candidates from scratch, now considering one or more new counterexamples that cause our tests to fail. We then repeat the tests on the new candidates that arise from this process. (2) Greedy Re nement: A simpler, heuristic approach is to re ne the candidate interval I to exclude the counterexample w : (w 1 , . . . , w N ) returned by Algo. 1. is is done by (a) choosing a dimension i and (b) reducing the width of the interval along dimension I to exclude w. e resulting intervalÎ is now tested from scratch using Algo. 1. In particular, the re-testing cannot use any previously seen samples to avoid biasing our test procedure. e choice of which dimension to shrink can a ect the interval we obtain. One strategy is to use the dimension that shrinks the least to exclude w. Another strategy is to x a priority order amongst the dimensions up front and choose the rst dimension whose current width is larger than the minimum permi ed width. A detailed comparison between these strategies will be provided in our extended version.
One important question is whether our approach can always eventually nd a falsifying neighborhood if one is known to exist. A "deterministic" guarantee is ruled out since the hypothesis testing can fail even though the neighborhood being tested is falsifying. However, since a subset of a falsifying neighborhood is also falsifying, it is possible to bound the probability of failure and prove probabilistic guarantees for our approach. We provide an analysis in our extended version.
Another important question is whether the sample points used in a previous iteration can be reused for statistical hypothesis testing in the next. We note that doing so can bias our samples since the data used to infer a hypothesis cannot be again used to test it. is leads to a situation akin to the well known "Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy".
EVALUATION
In this section, we describe the experimental evaluation of our approach over a series of benchmark systems drawn from our previous work. Each evaluation run uses the following scheme.
(1) We run the S-Taliro tool to collect a set of up to 5 seed counterexamples. (2) We sample control points around this seed and record the resulting robustness. (3) e samples are then used to collect upto N interval candidates using the optimization modulo theory solver implemented inside the Z3 SMT solver. (4) e interval candidates are tested using Algo. 1 and re ned heuristically until we accept the interval. e testing procedure is run with K = 1300 and c = 0.99, guaranteeing an appropriately small type-1 error likelihood ∼ 2.5×10 −4 .
adrotor System
We rst examine a planning problem for the quadrotor model of the robotics toolbox [12] , and also available as a demo example for the S-Taliro tool [6] . e model allows the speci cation of two types of regions: a "good" region that is to be visited by a quadrotor aircra and a "bad region" to be avoided. e system consists of a detailed model of a nonlinear quadrotor aircra which has two inputs representing the commanded x, position of the quadrotor. Internally, it uses nested PI controllers to stabilize the pitch and yaw to reach the desired commanded position. We use S-Taliro tool to command a sequence of x and positions so that the trajectories exhibit the following properties.
Property-1: e quadrotor should visit the good region, while avoiding the bad region.
Property-2:
e quadrotor should eventually enter and stay forever inside the good region while avoiding the bad region during the time interval [4, 5] .
Note, that in this instance, the tool S-Taliro is not used to falsify a requirement but rather to generate a control input to navigate the robot towards a speci ed goal. e input signals are piecewise constant over the time horizon with 5 pieces, giving us a total of Figure 6 : adrotor sample trajectories from the likely falsifying neighborhoods for Property-1 (le ) and Property-2 (right). In each gure the x and axis represents the position of the quadrotor in the con guration space. 10 control points. We generated 3 seed control points for each property. Our approach computes intervals around the seed control points that also constitute valid control inputs to achieve Property-1 and Property-2. Figure 6 shows the sampled trajectories from the intervals discovered by our algorithms.
Arti cial Pancreas System
is evaluation extends our previous work on falsifying MTL properties for an arti cial pancreas controller that controls the external insulin infusion in a patient with type-1 diabetes [10] .
e controller used in this example is directly inspired by the PID control scheme proposed by Steil et al. [37] [38] [39] . A detailed analysis of this control scheme was presented by Palerm [29] . In conjunction with this controller, we use the Dalla-Man et al model to capture the insulin-glucose regulation in the human patient [13, 26] .
We focus on the analysis of counterexamples obtained in our original work. Table 1 taken from Cameron et al. [10] describes the purpose of each dimension of the control points. ere are 111 in all, with 8 values for parameters that describe the meals and insulin boluses of the patient and 103 points that represent the sensor noise values. e property numbers used here are the same as in Cameron et al [10] . Property #2: is property expresses that the patient must not su er a severe hyperglycemia de ned as blood glucose levels above 350 mg/dl, two hours a er the controller is switched on. Our approach generalizes the the seed counterexample discovered by S-Taliro.
e SMT solver multiple candidates but only one was examined since all the candidate intervals were found to be quite close to each other. A er re nement, our procedure discovered a likely falsifying interval de ned by a narrow range around the seed counterexample for 4 out of the 111 parameters: these included .008] (insulin to carbohydrates ratio). e remaining 107 parameters can potentially take on any values within their permi ed ranges. In particular, we infer that the property violation depends on the rst meal time and amount, the timing (but not the amount) of the second meal and the insulin-to-carbs ratio of the patient. Figure 8 shows the blood glucose levels for 50 sample traces from the nal likely interval. Property #3: is property states that the controller must not infuse insulin when the patient's blood glucose levels are below 90 mg/dl. Once again, we started from a seed violation found by S-Taliro. However, in this case, the resulting box represented a very narrow range around the counterexample. Figure 9 shows the resulting simulations including the blood glucose and insulin levels. Here, we note that the violations happen at the very end of the simulation near time t = 720. Small changes to the seed counterexample resulted in a behavior that did not violate the property of interest. Property #6: is property states that the patient must not undergo a prolonged episode of hyperglycemia lasting more than 180 minutes, wherein the blood glucose levels are above 240mg/dl. For this property, we nd a falsifying interval that simply restricts two out of the 120 dimensions, speci cally the timing of meal # 1 is restricted to a narrow interval [10, 12] minutes and the amount of carbohydrates is restricted to [230, 250] . All other dimensions can vary arbitrarily across the full range. e falsifying interval once again highlights that the control algorithm is perhaps not "aggressive" enough to treat high blood glucose levels due to the safety limitations that saturate the insulin infusion to a maximum value. Table 2 summarizes the cumulative running times and the number of simulations for the various phases of our overall evaluation procedure. e running times were collected using a serial implementation of our algorithm implemented on a laptop with 2.8 GHz intel core i7 processor with 8 GB RAM. We note that each row of the quadrotor benchmark represents the cumulative running time for multiple seed counterexamples. Overall, the initial simulations dominate the running time, since we required a large number of simulations for our benchmarks. e time to infer boxes using Z3 was much smaller in comparison. Finally, the number of simulations needed by the test and re ne procedure is also reported. In each case, the time to simulate the model dominates the overall In particular, the time to sample boxes and re ne them was negligible in comparison. We will update our implementation to run multiple simulations in parallel, potentially yielding linear speedups. Machine Learning: We also used the data collected to learn classi ers to separate the counterexamples from those satisfying the property. We used two di erent approaches: a simple hyperplane separator (Lin. Sep. in Tab. 2) and a decision tree classi er (DTree) implemented using Python's scikit.learn package. Each classi er was trained on part of the simulation data (80% of the data for decision trees and 50% of the data for hyperplane classi ers), while using the remaining data to test. e accuracies over the test data averaged over multiple runs of the learning process are also reported.
We note that in a few cases, the hyperplane separators seem to be as precise as the falsifying intervals. However, the accuracies reported are not subject to rigorous statistical tests. e accuracies for the hyperplane classi ers are calculated by dividing the number of accurately classi ed samples by the total. Whereas, the falsifying interval is certi ed by much more stringent statistical test. Secondly, the accuracies are quite variable across di erent benchmark instances. us, the falsifying interval approach is much more expensive but yields consistent accuracies set by the threshold c = 0.99 with high con dence.
Finally, we also note that the decision trees are quite large and complex.
e decision tree obtained for the arti cial pancreas benchmark property 6 is shown in the appendix.
RELATED WORK
e theme of sensitivity analysis is perhaps closest to the approach presented in this paper. Both local and global sensitivity analysis aim to understand the input-output relationships for complex systems. For local sensitivity analysis, the input variables are perturbed one-at-a-time around a given baseline value, and ndings are plotted as sensitivity diagram (one plot for each variable depicting how output changes with respect to change in that variable), tornado diagram (a vertical bar-chart representation with variables ordered in terms of the sensitivity of the output), and spider diagram (plo ing change in output value against percentage change from the nominal value) [16] . In order to understand the e ects of interactions between various variables, sensitivity analysis techniques have been proposed where two or more variables are simultaneously perturbed. When the values of variables are chosen according to a given probability distribution, sensitivity analysis is known as probabilistic sensitivity analysis. A related idea is of uncertainty analysis [31] where the goal is to learn a probability distribution on the output given probability distributions over various input variables. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the rst a empt to apply sensitivity analysis to analyze counterexamples of temporal logic properties of CPS.
Recently Ferrere et al. investigate the problem of slicing traces to remove portions of a trace irrelevant to the truth of a temporal property ϕ [19] . eir approach seeks to help the same process of understanding violations that motivates our work as well. However, our work also e ectively accounts for the system model by searching over neighborhoods in the input space.
Statistical model checking [24, 40] is an e cient veri cation technique based on selective sampling of system traces in order to statistically verify the temporal logic properties of black-box systems. In this approach the traces of the systems are sampled according to a given distribution and checked against the system property until enough statistical evidence has been generated to verify the system. Statistical model checking has been e ectively applied to verify temporal logic properties of cyber-physical systems [11, 42] . While the focus of statistical model checking approach is to statistically verify the system, our focus is on explaining and widening the counterexamples to assist the system designer in further debugging.
Although the emphasis is much di erent, our approach can be considered as learning speci cation with the speci cation being the neighborhood around the counterexample that stays a counterexample. Speci cation mining is a well-studied topic in program veri cation [4, 25] and has been recently applied [21] to mine requirements for CPS. Another closely related research direction to speci cation mining is precondition [28] or invariant [36] inference by computing good and bad traces of a program.
Research on robust satisfaction of MTL formulas [17] and quantitative semantics for PSTL [15] extend the traditional qualitative notion of binary satis ability of logical formulas to quantitative notion of distance of system behavior from satisfying a specication. Such quantitative semantics provide rich insights with a counterexample related to "trend" of the satisfaction, that allows machine learning and mining approaches to uncover interesting properties of the system under veri cation [6, 17, 21, 27, 33] . Our work on analyzing neighborhood of counterexample is an example of such approach.
CONCLUSION
us, we have shown that our approach can be used to infer falsifying neighborhoods that allow us to conclude facts about which parts of the counterexample actually ma er for the falsi cation.
is can also potentially scale to large systems, as demonstrated by the arti cial pancreas benchmark, which has nearly 111 control parameters as inputs.
However, the approach relies on a large number of simulations to generate candidates and test them. Parallelizing our approach can mitigate the overall running time of this process. At the same time, the comparison with a few classi cation tools demonstrates the ability of our approach to infer falsifying neighborhoods with very high accuracies and statistical con dence. However, the main drawbacks lie in the use of heuristics in the re nement procedure. As part of our future work, we will investigate the inference of intervals as a theory integrated inside an SMT solver so that the failure of the test procedure can directly result in the addition of new clauses to the SMT formula, thus re ning the candidates in a systematic manner. 
